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NOTES AND COMMENT
CRIMINAL LAW
A RE-CONSIDERATION OF THE FELONY MuRDER DOCTRINE IN NEW
YORK-NATURE OF THE UNDERLYING FELONY-MERGER OF
THE FELONY AND HOMICIDE-RELATION OF THE
HOMICIDE TO THE FELONY.
Nature of the Felony.
The crime of murder at common law was homicide with malice
aforethought.' Since an intent to commit a felony was one form of
"mafice aforethought," a homicide consequent upon the commission
of a felony was murder, the malice attending the original crime being
imputed to the homicide. 2 The doctrine of "constructive murder" was
predicated upon the view that the perpetration of a felony was indica-
tive of a "wicked and depraved mind" and that a homicide occurring
in the execution of the intent to commit a felony was a natural and
probable result to be considered as within the original felonious de-
sign.3 That implication of law was justified, perhaps, in view of the
nature of common-law felonies. Nearly all were violent crimes in-
volving danger to life and attended by threats of grievous bodily in-
jury, so that a homicide as a result of their execution was not an un-
natural or unforeseeable consequence. 4
Today, in most jurisdictions, the felony murder doctrine has
been adopted by statutory enactments, usually restricted in applica-
tion to specified felonies of a "dangerous" character such as arson,
14 BLxcKsToNE's COMMENTARIES (1897) 198.
'For an extensive treatment of this subject see Perkins, A Re-examination
of Malice Aforethought (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 537.
' Where a homicide occurs in the commission of a felony the law presumes
"a depraved, wicked, and malignant spirit' which the offender actually had in
his heart, or which we impute to him because we suppose him to have intended
the necessary or probable consequences of that which he actually did or tried
to do. * * * If th crime intended was a felony, as at common law practically
all felonies were punishable with death, either with or without benefit of clergy,
the felonious intent of the intended crime was imputed to the committed act
and if it were homicide, made it murder, for it was considered immaterial
whether a man was hanged for one felony or another." Powers v. Common-
wealth, 110 Ky. 386, 61 S. W. 735 (1901).
' Common-law felonies included arson, rape, robbery, burglary, and larceny.
"In other words, with the single [?] exception of larceny, the common-law
felonies were either directed toward death or great bodily injury, or involved a
substantial risk of this nature." Perkins, loc. cit. supro note 2, at 560. Where
the unlawful act which preceded the killing did not amount to a felony the
crime was merely manslaughter. BLTcicsToNE, op. cit. mtpra note 1, at 192,
193.
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rape, robbery, burglary, etc., and classifying homicides resulting from
other unlawful acts in the lower degrees of murder and manslaughter. 5
Moreover, judicial limitations on the scope of the doctrine have, in
many instances, denied its application to crimes which could not be
considered dangerous and would not cause a reasonable man to con-
template the possibility of death ensuing. 6 So where the felony con-
sisted of selling liquor, the ensuing death was held not to be mur-
der, the crime being nlunm prohibitum, not malum in se, and
not one likely to result in death. 7
But the New York provision which makes the killing of a human
being, by one engaged in a felony, murder in the first degree is not,
by its phrasing, limited in application to common-law felonies or
crimes of a violent and dangerous nature.8 And since the legis-
lature may raise any crime to the class of felony by providing that
the penalty be imprisonment in a state prison,9 the question whether
the felony murder doctrine should be applied to all felonies without
regard to their nature becomes important.
There appear to be no cases of felony murder in New York
where the felony charged was not violent in character. However, in
People v. Enoch 10 the court declared that "as often as the legislature
creates new felonies, or raises offenses which were only misdemeanors
at the common law to the grade of felony, a new class of murders is
created by the application of this principle to the case of the killing
of a human being by a person who is engaged in the perpetration of
" See statutes cited in Arent and MacDonald, The Felony Murder Doctrine
and Its Application Under the New York Statutes (1935) 20 CoRN. L. Q.
288, 313.
' "I think that, instead of saying that any act done with intent to commit a
felony, and which causes death amounts to murder, it would be reasonable to
say that any act known to be dangerous to life and likely in itself to cause
death would be murder." Regina v. Serne, 16 Cox. C. C. 311 (1887). And
Powers v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 386, 61 S. W. 735 (1901), cited supra note
3, where the court was of the opinion that if one committing a felony by
stealing a cornerstone should, in so doing, drop the stone upon another, killing
him, the homicide would not be murder.
"If a man by the perpetration of a felonious act bring about the death of
a fellow creature he is guilty of murder, unless when he committed the
felonious act the chance of death resulting therefrom was so remote that no
reasonable man would have taken it into his consideration. In that case he is
not guilty of murder but only of manslaughter." Regina v. Whitmarsh, 62
Just. P. 711 (1898). See also 4 STEPHEN, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND (16th ed. 1914) 62.
'People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562, 199 N. W. 373 (1924) ; Thiede v. State,
106 Neb. 48, 182 N. W. 570 (1921) ; State v. Reitze, 86 N. J. L. 407, 92 Atl.
576 (1914). In New York such a homicide is manslaughter. People v.
Licenziata, 199 App. Div. 106, 191 N. Y. Supp. 619 (2d Dept. 1921).
ON. Y. PENAL LAW § 1044 (2) : "The killing of a human being unless it
is justifiable or excusable, is murder in the first degree, when committed * * *
without a design to effect death, by a person engaged in the commission of, or
in an attempt to commit a felony, either upon or affecting the person killed
or otherwise. * * *"
IN. Y. PENAL LAW § 2.20 13 Wend. 159, 174 (N. Y. 1834).
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a newly created felony." And the historical background of the pres-
ent statute on felony murder lends support to the view that the New
York rule includes every felony irrespective of its nature or propen-
sities to violence, for whereas, at one time the crime of felony mur-
der was limited to homicides resulting from specified felonies, the
statute now places no such restriction on the application of the
doctrine.11
The Merger Principle.
It cannot be said, however, that every homicide resulting from
the perpetration of a felony is murder. Since every section of the
statute on murder in the first and second degrees concerns a homi-
cide as a result of a felony, a failure to distinguish between those
homicides which are caused by the very acts of violence constituting
the felony and those caused by acts other than those of the felony,
separate therefrom and independent thereof, would classify every
unlawful homicide as felony murder and would deprive the other sec-
tions of the statute on murder and manslaughter of any force or
effect.1  The division of criminal homicides into different degrees
would fail of purpose if every unlawful death, brought about by
conduct which is also a felony, were treated as felony murder. It
is because of this situation that the principle of merger has been
developed.1 3
'The felony murder doctrine first adopted in the Revised Statutes of 1828
(2 N. Y. Rrv. STAT. [1829] 657, § 5 [3]) was declaratory of the common law,
making the killing by a person engaged in any felony, murder. By the Laws
of 1860, c. 410, § 2, only death from arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or escape
from imprisonment, was murder in the first degree, all other felony homicides
being second degree murder. The Laws of 1862, c. 197, § 5, reduced all felony
murders, except death from arson, to the second degree. The Laws of 1873,
c. 644, § 1, restored felony murder to the first degree, omitting reference to any
particular type of felony. The provision has remained substantially the same
ever since. See Perkins, loc. cit. .mpra note 2, at 563, n. 194.
"If such a distinction were not made "* * * then every intentional killing,
by means of a dangerous weapon, regardless of deliberation and premeditation
would constitute the crime of murder in the first degree, since every such killing
must be preceded by the direction of such a weapon against the body of the
person killed, which in itself would constitute a felonious assault. ***" People
v. Wagner, 245 N. Y. 143, 156 N. E. 644 (1927).
"For similar reasons, the principle of merger is also applicable to the
homicide, committed by a person engaged in committing, or attempting to
commit, a misdemeanor affecting the person or property, either of the person
killed or another, which is manslaughter in the first degree. N. Y. PFNAL
LAW § 1050, subd. 1.
But thi courts relying on the opinion of Buel v. People, 78 N. Y. 492
(1879) have refused to consider the merger even where the misdemeanor was
an assault upon the deceased. So in People v. McKeon, 31 Hun 449 (N. Y.
1884), though the defendant contended that under this section of the man-
slaughter statute, the misdemeanor must be some offense other than that of
intentional violence upon the person killed, citing People v. Butler, 3 Park.
1936 ]
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Where one commits a felonious assault upon another, whereof
the latter dies, the crime is not felony murder, for the felony is said
to merge with the homicide which is then classed under one of the
other sections of the statute.1 4
In People v. Moran 15 the evidence indicated that the defendant
committed an assault upon A and B, killing the latter. The Court
of Appeals reversed the conviction because the trial court had refused
to submit the other degrees of murder and manslaughter, declaring
that the facts warranted the jury in finding that the assault upon A
had terminated before the assault upon B had begun, in which case
the homicide would not have been committed in the course of the
assault upon A, and the assault upon B would merge in the homicide;
moreover, if the assault had been directed toward both at the same
time, so that the assault upon A was indistinguishable from that upon
B, the felony merged with the homicide. Nor would an assault di-
rected toward A but resulting in the death of B be felony murder,
for the assault would be an offense against B and the crime would
come under the other sections of the statute.'8 Likewise, in People
v. Spohr,17 the assault upon A had terminated before the fatal attack
Cr. R. 377 (N. Y. 1857), the court, citing Buel v. People, supra, said: "The
question has already received some discussion in the courts, and in the view which
we take of the case, the weight of authority must be regarded as adverse to the
contention of the accused."
In People v. Stacey, 119 App. Div. 743, 104 N. Y. Supp. 615 (3d Dept.
1907), aff'd memo., 192 N. Y. 577, 85 N. E. 1114 (1908), the court, upon
similar facts, cited and followed the McKeon case.
However, in the more recent case of People -. Grieco, 266 N. Y. 48, 193
N. E. 634 (1934), where the misdemeanor charged was reckless driving, the
court, disapproving People v. Darragh, 141 App. Div. 408, 126 N. Y. Supp. 522(1st Dept. 1910), aft'd, 203 N. Y. 527, 96 N. E. 1124 (1911), held: (1) that
the misdemeanor charged did not affect the person or property of the one killed
or of another; (2) that the misdemeanor of assault upon the deceased merged
in the homicide.
"People v. Hfiter, 184 N. Y. 237, 77 N. E. 6 (1906); People v. Spohr,
206 N. Y. 516, 100 N. E. 444 (1912); People v. Moran, 246 N. Y. 100, 158
N. E. 35 (1927).
-246 N. Y. 100, 158 N. E. 35 (1927).
" In People v. Van Norman, 231 N. Y. 454, 132 N. E. 147 (1921), the
indictment was for the homicide of A committed in the course of a felony, to
wit: assault upon B with intent to kill B. The question whether this was a
proper application of the statufe was not raised, but conviction was reversed
because the trial court refused to submit murder in the second degree. In its
opinion the court cited People v. Miles, 143 N. Y. 383, 38 N. E. 456 (1894)
where the evidence admitted of the inference that the defendant accidentally
killed A in assaulting B. There also the merger theory went unnoticed, the
issue being whether the word "otherwise" in the statute included the word
"another"; the holding being in the affirmative.
In view of the opinion in People v. Moran, 246 N. Y. 100, 158 N. E. 35
(1927), neither of the above cases can be considered authority for the view
that an assault upon one resulting in the death of another, is felony murder, for
the act producing the homicide is a part of the original assault.
27206 N. Y. 516. 100 N. E. 444 (1912).
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upon B had begun, and the ensuing death of B was not felony
murder.
Where the felony is an assault upon one other than the deceased
and it continues in progress when the second assault is undertaken,
the original crime does not merge in the ensuing homicide. Thus in
People v. Wagner's where the defendant in the course of assaulting
A, killed B who attempted to interfere, though the assault upon B
merged with the homicide, the original assault sustained a felony
murder charge.19
The principle is not limited to the felonies of assault but is ap-
plicable wherever the violence causing death is a constituent part of
the underlying felony.20 So where the felony charged is an assault
with intent to prevent the lawful arrest of any person,21 and the re-
sistance culminates in death, the felony is merged. 22 But where the
defendants killed in an attempt to escape from a state prison, the
homicide was a felony murder caused by an assault not a part of the
original felony.23 And the crime of escaping from arrest for a fel-
ony 24 may he the basis for a felony murder where death is caused
by assault which is not an element of the felony charged.25
The felony does not merge with the homicide where death is
caused by any act not an integral part of the felony, so that where a
robber shoots his victim, the homicide is murder, even if the killing
" 245 N. Y. 143, 156 N. E. 644 (1927).
" To the same effect, People v. Giblin, 115 N. Y. 196, 21 N. E. 1062
(1889); People v. Patini, 208 N. Y. 176, 101 N. E. 694 (1913).
'Dicta in People v. Marendi, 213 N. Y. 600, 107 N. E. 1058 (1919), would
apply the merger theory to the felony of possessing a dangerous weapon by a
second offender (N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1897, par. 4) so that a death caused
by the use of such weapon would not be felony murder. This is not an apt use
of the merger principle. A homicide under such circumstances would not be
felony murder because it would not be a consequence of, or caused by the
conduct of, the felony. So in Potter v. State, 162 Ind. 213, 70 N. E. 129(1904) the court said: "It is undoubtedly true, as a general rule of law, that
a person engaged in the commission of an unlawful act is legally responsible
for all of the consequences which may naturally or necessarily flow or result
from such unlawful act. But before this principle of law can have any
application under the facts in the case at bar, it must appear that the homicide
was the natural or necessary result of the act of appellant.in carrying the
revolver in violation of the statute." Contra: Shelburne v. State, 111 Tex. Cr.
R. 182, 11 S. W. (2d) 519 (1928).
; N. Y. PENAL LAW § 242, subd. 5.
1 People v. Hfiter, 184 N. Y. 237, 77 N. E. 6 (1906), cited supra note 14.
'People v. Johnson, 110 N. Y. 134, 17 N. E. 684 (1888); People v.
Flanigan, 174 N. Y. 356, 66 N. E. 988 (1903); People v. Weiner, 248 N. Y.
118, 161 N. E. 441 (1928); People v, Udwin, 254 N. Y. 225, 172 N. E. 489
(1930).
N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1694.
People v. Wilson, 145 N. Y. 628, 40 N. E. 392 (1895).
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was accidental. 26  In every case, if the homicide and the felony are
committed by the same act, they merge.27
But the application of the merger principle to the crime of rape
where death ensues from the violence constituting the felony, has
met with some confusion.28  In Buel v. People,29 the defendant
strangled his victim while perpetrating the crime of rape. The con-
tention was made that since violence was an essential element of the
crime, the felony merged in the homicide resulting from that violence.
The court, in refusing to apply the merger principle, said "While
force and violence constitute an important element of the crime of
rape, they do not constitute the entire body of that offense. The
unlawful or carnal knowledge is the essence of the crime, and with-
out this no matter what degree of force or violence may be employed,
rape is not established" and then added "The decision of the General
Term sustaining the charge is placed upon the ground that the death
' People v. Wise, 163 N. Y. 440, 57 N. E. 740 (1900) ; People v. Lingley,
207 N. Y. 396, 101 N. E. 170 (1913); People v. Michalow, 229 N. Y. 325,
128 N. E. 228 (1920) ; People v. Slover, 232 N. Y. 264, 133 N. E. 633 (1921) ;
People v. Lytton, 257 N. Y. 310, 178 N. E. 290 (1931). See also Cox v. People,
80 N. Y. 500 (1880) ; People v. Schleiman, 197 N. Y. 383, 90 N. E. 950 (1910)
and People v. Udwin, 254 N. Y. 255, 172 N. E. 489 (1930). In other juris-
dictions: Commonwealth v. McManus, 282 Pa. 25, 127 Atl. 316 (1925); Mc-
Cutcheon v. State, 199 Ind. 247, 155 N. E. 544 (1927) ; State v. Best, 44 Wyo.
383, 12 P. (2d) 1110 (1932).
In this connection an interesting case is Keaton v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. R.
621, 57 S. W. 1125 (1900), where a trainman, forced by robbers to step into a
car defended by passengers, was killed by a bullet fired from within the train.
There the homicide was felony murder because a foreseeable consequence of
the felony. In New York such a homicide would probably be considered caused
by the robbers and thus come within the felony murder statute.
' The following analysis was urged in People v. Hiiter, 184 N. Y. 237,
77 N. E. 6 (1906), cited supra notes 14. 22: "In order, therefore, to constitute
murder in the first degree by the unintentional killing of another while engaged
in the commission of a felony, we think that while violence may constitute a
part of the homicide, yet the other elements constituting the felony must be so
distinct from that of the homicide as not to be an ingredient of the homicide,
indictable therewith or convictable thereunder." This test would evidently
limit merger to the felonies of assault, ignoring the other felonies like rape,
robbery, etc., and would not adequately effectuate the purpose of the principle.
The court's attitude was based on the erroneous conception held by the Buel
case (treated in text). However, the rule was quoted in People v. Spohr, 206
N. Y. 516, 100 N. E. 444 (1912), cited supra note 17, without comment.
"' Elsewhere such a crime is generally governed by the express provision
of the statute applicable. See Hoppe v. State, 29 Ohio App. 467, 163 N. E. 715
(1928), where death was caused by the act of rape on a seven-year-old child.
In New York, such a crime might be punishable as "an act evincing a depraved
mind." See note 32, infra.
Where the statutes do not specify the felony, the acts of the felony which
caused the death, merge with the homicide. In State v. Shock, 68 Mo. 552
(1878), under a statute which specified "arson, rape, robbery, burglary," the
assault merged. Subsequently the felony of mayhem was included in the
statute; see Arent and MacDonald, loc. cit. supra note 5, at 299. See also
State v. Fischer, 120 Kan. 226, 243 Pac. 291 (1926).
278 N. Y. 492 (1879), aff'g, 18 Hun 487 (N. Y. 1879).
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did not result from rape, but from the strangling of the girl, which
was an act distinct from rape. While there are strong reasons for
sustaining this view, as we have arrived at the conclusion that the
charge may be upheld upon the grounds we have stated, it is not
necessary to consider that aspect of the question." 30 The court rested
its decision upon the conclusion that the statute then in effect was
declarative of the common law doctrine of felony murder, which re-
garded every homicide resulting from a felony as murder. But the
court apparently failed to appreciate the purpose of the merger
theory, for at common law there were no degrees of murder and
hence there was no need to apply the merger principle to distinguish
between different types of criminal homicides. Moreover, the stat-
ute governing felony murder at the time of the Buel case no longer
specified the crime of rape as a felony included in its scope, but treat-
ed all felonies alike as proper bases for murder charges.
The opinion in People v. Hiiter 31 enlarged upon the miscon-
ception in the Buel dicta, for the court said "It does not follow, how-
ever, that in the other felonies, in order to bring the case within the
statute defining murder, the act which caused the death must be a
different one from that done in the commission of a collateral felony.
By the same act one may commit two crimes, and to constitute mur-
der in the first degree, as in the commission of a felony, it is not
necessary that there should be an act collateral to or independent
of that which causes death; but if the act causing death be committed
with a collateral and independent design, it is sufficient; thus if the
violence used to commit a rape or robbery results in death the case
is plainly within the statute, and so this court has held in the cases
above referred to [Buel v. People]."
Much more was said in the Hiiter case than was necessary to
the decision, and the Buel opinion was not restricted to the facts then
before the court. These two unfortunate expressions of dicta have
cast doubt upon the purpose and scope of the felony murder doctrine
in New York. But since there appears to be no case in this state
where the very acts of a felony caused a death, the courts may yet
disregard the reasoning of the above opinions and conform to the
general rule. Then a homicide resulting from the acts constituting
the felony will be treated, and properly so, under the other sections
-78 N. Y. 492, 500 (1879) [italics supplied]. See also People v. Scher-
merhorn, 203 N. Y. 57, 96 N. E. 376 (1911) ; People v. Wolter, 203 N. Y. 484,
97 N. E. 30 (1911);
In Regina v. Greenwood, 7 Cox C. C. 404 (1857), the victim of rape died
of a venereal disease contracted from the defendant in the act. The court
declared that the defendant could be convicted of a felony murder. This view
is founded upon the common-law doctrine which is applied in England. In
New York, the crime probably would not be felony murder under the statute.
184 N. Y. 237, 244, 77 N. E. 69 (1906). O'Brien and Vann, JJ., con-
curred except as to that part of the opinion quoted, as to which they expressed no
opinion.
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of the statute.3 2  So where death results from arson in the first de-
gree the crime is murder under that section which specifically pro-
vides for such homicide,83 and is not felony murder. Or where the
victim of a robbery dies of fright induced by the act of robbery, where
no independent assault was perpetrated, the homicide is not felony
murder but one of the other forms of criminal homicides.
Relation of the Homicide to the Felony.
There is one other aspect of the felony murder doctrine which
must be taken into consideration in determining whether any given
homicide is felony murder. Is every homicide which is not a conse-
quence of the underlying felony, nor committed in furtherance there-
of, but merely coincidental thereto, felony murder? Manifestly, the
characterization of a homicide, which is completely divorced from the
felony except in point of time, as a felony murder, is not a just ex-
pression of the spirit and intent of the doctrine.
The New York decisions have confined the felony murder doc-
trine to those homicides committed "during the course of the fel-
ony." 34 The felony must be so related to the homicide by time, place,
'Homicides caused by felonious acts may be (1) murder in the first
degree when committed:
"From a deliberate and premeditated design to effect the death of the
person killed, or of another"; (N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1044, subd. 1).
"By an act imminently dangerous to others, and evincing a depraved
mind regardless of life. * * *" (N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1044, subd. 2.)
By committing arson in the first degree. (N. Y. PENAL LAW
§ 1044, subd. 3.)
By injuring railroad property. (N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1044, subd. 4.)
(2) murder in the second degree when committed:
"with a design to effect the death of the person killed, or of another, but
without deliberation and premeditation." (N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1046.)
(3) manslaughter in the first degree when committed without a design to
effect death:
"In the heat of passion but in a crel and unusual manner, or by
means of a dangerous weapon." (N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1050, subd. 2.)
By injury to a woman for purpose of killing the unborn quick
child of which she is pregnant. (N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1050, subd. 2,
par. 2.)
To produce a miscarriage. (N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1050, subd. 2,
par. 3.)
IN. Y. PENAL LAW § 1044 (3). In People v. Greenwall, 115 N. Y. 520,
22 N. E. 180 (1889), the court apparently "did not have a clear comprehension
of the force and effect" of the felony murder subdivision, when it said that
subdivision 3 was evidently the work of one who "clearly did not have a clear
comprehension of the force and effect of the prior subdivision."
People v. Walsh, 262 N. Y. 140, 186 N. E. 422 (1933) ; People v. Ryan,
263 N. Y. 298, 189 N. E. 225 (1934). Felony Murder-Necessity for the Con-
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and other circumstances as to justify a jury in finding that the homi-
cide was committed in the course of the felony. Where the defendant.
was apprehended and seized by the proprietor of the store he was
burglarizing, his presence on the premises was not conclusive evi-
dence that the felony was still in progress when the homicide oc-
curred.3 5 And where a burglar was in flight, and had abandoned the
loot when the homicide took place, the felony had terminated and the.
crime was not felony murder.36
But there has been very little indication that the homicide must
occur not only during the commission of the felony but must also
spring out of it or be caused in furtherance of it, to become felony
murder.37
Elsewhere, the homicide is not treated as murder unless it is in
consequence of the felony. In Texas, a statute made "driving while
intoxicated" a felony. But one, who while so driving, was caused by
a flat tire to swerve, striking and killing another, was held to be not
guilty of felony murder unless it appeared that the commission of
the felony was the operative cause of the accident. 8
In Missouri, under a statute making a death caused by arson,
murder, a defendant was convicted for the homicide of a fireman
called to extinguish the fire started by the defendant, the court re-
garding the death as a consequence of the arson.3 9
In Wisconsin a defendant was held not guilty of murder where
death resulted from a fire caused by him while engaged in the felony
of rape, the court saying there was "no such relationship between the
crimes as to make one a consequence of the former or to transfer
intent of one to the other" and "the felony committed must have
some intimate and close connection with the killing and must not be
separate and distinct and independent from it." 
40
tinmance of the Uidterlying Crime, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 9, 1935, at 722, Feb. 11,
1935, at 746, and Eisenberg, The Doctrine of Felony Murder in New York,
N. Y. L. J., Jan. 17, 1935, at 296, Jan. 18, 1935, at 316.
People v. Smith, 232 N. Y. 239, 133 N. E. 574 (1921).
'People v. Marwig, 227 N. Y. 382, 125 N. E. 535 (1919).
There was some mention of such limitation in Buel v. People, 78 N. Y.
892 (1879); People v. Sobieskoda, 235 N. Y. 411, 139 N. E. 558 (1923);
People v. Ryan, 263 N. Y. 298, 189 N. E. 225 (1934).
'Burton v. State, 177 Tex. Cr. App. 363, 55 S. W. (2d) 813 (1932). The
court said: "In the case before us, and in any such case, the trial judge should
submit to the jury the issue as to whether the accident or mistake resulted
from the fact of the driver being under the influence of intoxicating liquor or
from a cause or causes not reasonable growing out of or resulting from such a
condition, and the jury should be told to acquit if the latter be true."
' State v. Glover, 330 Mo. 709, 50 S. W. (2d) 1049 (1932), decided under a
statute specifying arson. 4 Mo. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1932).
1 Pliemling v. State, 46 Wis. 516, 1 N. W. 278 (1879). The Wisconsin
statute, similar to that of New York, includes "any felony."
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Obviously the felony murder doctrine in New York under the
statute cannot be properly effectuated unless it is limited to the homi-
cide which has a "causal" connection with the underlying felony. 41
Conclusions.
The application of the felony murder doctrine in New York has
been fraught with difficulties. Time after time the Court of Appeals
has reversed convictions under the statute because of errors com-
mitted by trial courts in their interpretation of it.
In the main, the cause of the confusion surrounding the doctrine
in New York may be found in the desire of the courts to limit its
application to crimes meriting the harsh penalty exacted by it with-
out violating the expressed intent of the statute embodying the
doctrine.
Hence, when provisions for lesser degrees of criminal homicide
had been enacted, the courts, to effectuate their purpose, refused to
consider homicides, caused by the very acts comprising the felony, as
felony murder. But the views of the Buel and Hiiter opinions caused
complications. Under them, one who commits second degree rape 42
with the "victim's" consent, would be guilty of felony murder, if
death resulted from the act. Such an interpretation is patently un-
sound, and it is to be hoped that the courts will utilize the first oppor-
tunity of expressing their disapproval.
When it was established that the statute on felony murder gov-
erned all felonies regardless of their nature, the courts construed the
section to cover only homicides committed during the progress of the
felony. But to determine whether the felony was in progress at the
time of the homicide has not been a simple matter in the midst of
complex, factual situations.43  And some opposition has arisen
against this test. 4 This requirement would not prevent a conviction
for felony murder where one engaged in grand larceny by removing
the stolen property in an automobile, collides with another, killing
" This phase of the doctrine becomes especially important where the defen-
dant participated with others in the felony but did not commit the homicide and
the evidence indicates that the death was not part of the common design but
was committed by a confederate in the pursuance of a personal motive. Cf.
People v. Sobieskoda, 235 N. Y. 411, 139 N. E. 558 (1923) ; People v. Ryan,
263 N. Y. 298, 189 N. E. 225 (1934).
IN. Y. PENAL LAW § 2010, subd. 5, par. 3 .
"For examples, see People v. Walsh, 262 N. Y. 140, 186 N. E. 422 (1923);
People v. Moran, 246 N. Y. 100, 158 N. E. 35 (1927).




him; though the defendant be free from any negligence whatever.
Such a death should not be treated as murder.
If the requirement were that the acts causing the homicide must
be so connected with the felony as to be within the original felonious
design or committed because of, or in furtherance of the felony, in
order that the death be murder, the felony murder doctrine would be
more properly and justly applied.
G. ROBERT ELLEGAARD.
ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR CRIMES IN A PROSECUTION FOR FORGERY.
At common law, the introduction of any evidence proving a
crime, other than that charged in the indictment, was severely cen-
sured and the exceptions to this narrow view were fostered with
reluctance. Such solicitude for the criminal was undoubtedly moti-
vated by the same judicial philosophy which has created the presump-
tion of innocence and the rule of reasonable doubt.'
In the case of People v. Molineux,2 the court, in considering the
admissibility of independent crimes, restricted their introduction to
cases wherein such unrelated crimes bore directly on the issues pre-
sented and tended to prove either intent, motive, absence of mistake,
identity or furtherance of a preconceived plan. In considering the
application of this rule to forgery,3 it must be noted that forgery is
a crime which can be committed in either of two ways, viz., the
crime of forgery 4 and the crime of uttering a forged instrument5
The Rule As Applied to the Crime of Forgery."
To Prove the Act. To establish the crime of forgery, two things
must be proven, (a) a specific intent to defraud,7 and (b) the act
'People v. Sharp, 107 N. Y. 427, 14 N. E. 319 (1887); Coleman v. People,
55 N. Y. 81 (1873); RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE (4th ed. 1931) § 148; People v.
Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, 291, 61 N. E. 286 (1901) ; People v. Durkin, 330 Ill.
394, 161 N. E. 739 (1928).
2 168 N. Y. 264, 61 N. E. 286 (1901).
IN. Y. PENAL LAW art. 84.
'N. Y. PENAL LAW §§ 884, 887.
" N. Y. PENAL LAW § 881.
Forgery as considered under this heading refers to forging as distinguished
from uttering a forged instrument.
N. Y. PENAL LAW § 880; People v. Molineux, 160 N. Y. 264, 61 N. E.
286 (1901), "It will be seen that the crimes referred to under this head, con-
stitute distinct classes in which the intent is not to be inferred from the act,
** *." People v. Katz, 209 N. Y. 311, 327, 103 N. E. 305 (1913), after stating
the general rule against admissibility of prior crimes, continues, "there are
various recognized exceptions to this rule, however, and one of them is that
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